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Abstract Exit discrimination is defined as the involuntary termination of em-
ployment due to racial characteristics holding productivity constant. We test for
exit discrimination in the National Football League (NFL) using a panel study
on career length. Our analysis focuses on six positional groups: defensive
backs, defensive linemen, linebackers, running backs, tight ends and wide
receivers. In our analysis, in addition to race, we include performance variables
to determine their importance in determining career length. Using both para-
metric and semi-parametric hazard models, we find no evidence of exit dis-
crimination in the NFL.
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Literature Review
Labor market discrimination comes in many forms. Becker (1957) provided a seminal
treatment for analyzing its theoretical foundations. Labor economists have found the
area of professional sports to be a productive area in which to conduct empirical studies
of labor market discrimination. With the abundance of readily available measures of
employee productivity and salary information, researchers discovered a virtual labora-
tory to conduct experiments according to Kahn (2000).
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In major league baseball, Gwartney and Haworth (1974) used data following the
fall of the color barrier in baseball to support Becker’s theoretical assertion that
less discriminatory employers could gain a competitive advantage by hiring more
productive black players at a lower cost. Despite the influx of black players into
Major League Baseball (MLB), Pascal and Rapping (1972), Scully (1974), Medoff
(1975) and Mogull (1975) still found significant performance differences between
black and white baseball players suggesting barriers to entry. Similar findings
emerged in the National Basketball Association (NBA) concerning black-white
performance differentials (Scully 1973 and Brown et al. 1991) and in the National
Hockey League (NHL) for French-Canadian versus non-French-Canadian players
(Lavoie et al. 1987).
Pay Discrimination
The vast majority of research into labor market discrimination in professional
sports focuses on pay discrimination. Scully (1974) found significant pay discrim-
ination against black players using 1968-69 data in baseball. Using the technique
developed by Oaxaca (1973), Hill and Spellman (1984) did not find evidence of
pay discrimination against minority players using 1976-1977 baseball data, nor
have most researchers since. Perhaps, the addition of salary arbitration to the MLB
collective bargaining agreement in 1973 and the addition of free agency in the
1976 agreement have eliminated pay discrimination in baseball. Or perhaps, using
a Becker-like argument, market competition for the best players in a competitive
environment to achieve a winning team has overcome personal prejudice. Recently
however, Palmer and King (2006) and Holmes (2011) both conclude that there is
pay discrimination against black and Hispanic players in the lower ranges of the
salary distribution in baseball.
In hockey, both Lavoie et al. (1987) and Jones and Walsh (1988) found significant
pay discrimination against French-Canadian defensemen using 1977–78 data. Research
into pay discrimination in the NBA has provided similar results. Kahn and Sherer
(1988) created quite a stir with their finding of substantial pay discrimination against
black players in a league that was dominated (75 %) by black athletes. However more
recent research (Hill 2004 and Bodvarsson and Brastow 1999) has failed to find salary
discrimination in the NBA using data from the 1990s. The institutionalization of pay in
the NBA through various collective bargaining agreements may have eliminated most
possibilities of personal prejudice in contracting. However, Kahn and Shah (2005)
suggest there was pay discrimination against nonwhite marginal players in the 2001-02
season.
Positional Discrimination
An offshoot of barrier-to-entry discrimination can be found in the positional segrega-
tion sports literature. Pascal and Rapping (1972) and Scully (1974) among others found
that blacks in baseball were more likely to be found in the outfield versus pitching,
catching or infield positions. The offered explanations could easily be characterized
according to Becker's (1957) separation of the source of personal prejudice by
customers (fans), fellow employees (players), or employers/managers (team owners/
coaches). In the NBA Kahn and Sherer (1988) found underrepresentation of blacks at
the center and forward position but in an earlier study Curtis and Loy (1978) did not
observe positional segregation patterns. Lavoie (1989) found evidence of positional
stacking involving minority (French-Canadian) hockey players. More recently, Pitts and
Yost (2013) found position segregation in college football where black high school
quarterbacks and white high school running backs were more likely to change positions
in college than their white and black counterparts, respectively.
Exit Discrmination
Johnson and Marple (1973) pioneered a new branch of discrimination research when
they found evidence from 1970-71 NBA data that marginal white players had longer
careers than marginal black players. Hoang and Rascher (1999) more formally devel-
oped a model to explore the concept of racially-based retention barriers in the NBA.
They, too, found evidence that, performance being equal, there was “exit discrimina-
tion” in the NBA. Groothuis and Hill (2004) failed to confirm Hoang and Rascher’s
results using more recent data, height as an added explanatory variable, and a duration
model that allowed for both stock and flow samples. Jiobu (1988) found evidence that
race decreased career length, ceteris paribus, for black players but not Hispanics using
Major League Baseball data from 1971 to 1985. Again, Groothuis and Hill (2008)
failed to find exit discrimination in MLB using more recent data from 1990 to 2004 and
a model that better accounted for performance decay.
Discrimination in the NFL
Overall very few studies have examined discrimination in the NFL (Ducking et al.
2014, Keefer 2013, Gius and Johnson 2000, Kahn 1992, Mogull 1981, Mogull 1973
and Scully 1973). Most of these studies examined wage discrimination. Keefer (2013),
Kahn (1992) and Mogull (1981) all find white players were paid a wage premium.
Using career earnings, Ducking et al. (2014) find no evidence of compensation
discrimination. Lastly, Gius and Johnson (2000) found black players were paid a
premium of about ten percent; however, their results were only significant at the ten
percent level.1 Scully (1973) focusing on positional discrimination, found that black
players tended to be overrepresented at the defensive backs, running backs, and wide
receivers positions while being underrepresented as quarterbacks, kicking specialists,
centers, guards, and linebackers. No study has looked at exit discrimination in the NFL.
Theory
The textbook definition of discrimination in the labor market implies that certain
individuals or groups of workers are somehow treated differently than others unrelated
to ability or performance. As discussed above labor economists have explored a variety
1 Although Gius and Johnson (2000) find a ten percent wage premium for black NFL players their
specifications do not include any performance variables suggesting that the race variable is capturing the
impact of performance.
of formats for this differential treatment. Exit discrimination may represent the most
recent path of research in the field. Hoang and Rascher (1999) define exit discrimina-
tion as “the involuntary dismissal of workers based on the preferences of employers,
coworkers, or customers.” Research on this topic assumes that all turnover is involun-
tary; Kahn (1991, p. 406) argues that the high salaries paid in sports make voluntary
quits unlikely. Thus these studies are essentially survival models. If white players have
longer careers than black players with similar performance statistics then exit discrim-
ination is said to exist.2
Jiobu (1988) and Hoang and Rascher (1999) concluded that career length for
black players in Major League Baseball and the NBA respectively were lower than
their white counterparts, ceteris paribus. While Jiobu does not make any calculations
on the impact of exit discrimination on career earnings, Hoang and Rascher (1999)
conclude that this form of discrimination led to almost a two and a half times greater
decrease in black career pay compared to the more heavily analyzed form of pay
discrimination.
The motivation behind this form of discrimination could obviously come from
personal prejudice on the part of owners/coaches or fans. Hoang and Rascher (1999)
focused on customers as the source of the prejudice; the pay premium for white players
was explained by the higher value of their performances compared to black players
because of the prejudiced preferences of white, majority fans. Hoang and Rascher
(1999, p.74) hypothesized:
“To satisfy the fans, there is a minimum number of white players on a team. The
second assumption, that the pool of quality available talent is becoming increas-
ingly black, causes annual replacement of players with rookies to occur mostly
among black players. The white players have longer careers simply because there
are fewer qualified white rookies to replace them,…”
In his study of exit discrimination in Major League Baseball, Jiobu (1988, p.532)
does not specifically test for customer discrimination but he does state:
“Perhaps, motivated by the concern that white fans will not support a predomi-
nantly black team, management has silently placed an “invisible ceiling” on the
black percentage. When coupled with the desire to have a winning team, this
ceiling would generate strong pressures to (a) employ as many black players as
possible in order to capitalize on their performance, but (b) in order to remain
under the ceiling, to eliminate black players as soon as their performance
declined, and (c) to retain white players of declining but similar ability.”
Given the predominance of black athletes in the NFL today, the two arguments
advanced above for baseball and basketball could easily be applied to football. Our
2 Due to the potential for injury and health related issues some of the exit in the NFL might be employee
initiated particularly with running backs such as Rashard Mendenhall, Tiki Barber, Ray Lewis and Barry
Sanders. To address this concern we perform our survival analysis by analyzing a varying subset of players
including those who earn the mean wage and below, one million and below, and five hundred thousand and
below. We find that all specifications are essentially the same as the full specification. In all specifications, we
find that performance lowers the likelihood of exit and that race has no influence on exit.
current research attempts to address this gap in the sports economics literature on
discrimination by using both a Weibull proportional hazard model and a semi-
parametric hazard model to test for differential survival patterns between black and
white professional football players in the NFL.
Data
We use NFL data from 2000 to 2008 on six positional groups to perform this
analysis. We split these groups into an offensive sample and a defensive sample.
The offensive sample includes running backs, tight ends and wide receivers. The
defensive sample includes defensive backs, linebackers and defensive linemen.
These six positions are chosen because productivity measures are available and
there are typically at least 3 players that play these positions for each team
during a football game. Quarterback, punter and kicker are positions in which
less than 3 players play in a game. These positions are excluded because of the
small sample size. Offensive linemen are excluded because productivity measures
are not available. We utilize productivity and demographic information as control
variables in this analysis. Performance and demographic data are obtained from
the NFL official website (www.nfl.com/players).3
In both the offensive and defensive models, we include games played and
games started. These and all other player performance variables are time varying,
and measured by season. Games played measures how often the player is used
on the field by the team. This captures an intensity margin of productivity. Those
players who are considered starters, and hence start the game, are typically
considered the highest performing players. While these are crude proxies, they
accurately measure the team’s perception of the value of the player and thus are
expected to have a positive impact on a player’s career length or probability of
duration.
Defensive player productivity is measured by tackles, sacks, passes defended,
interceptions, and forced fumbles. Tackles are defined as the total number of
times a player tackles an opponent during a season. Sacks are defined as the total
number of times a player tackles the opposing quarterback behind the line of
scrimmage during a season. Passes defended and interceptions measure the total
number of times a player breaks up a pass or catches a pass thrown by the
opposing quarterback. Forced fumbles are defined as the total number of times a
defensive player causes an offensive player to lose the football. Tackles, sacks,
passes defended, interceptions, and forced fumbles are expected to have a
positive impact on career length because they measure the impact of the player’s
ability to help his team stop their opponent from scoring.
Offensive player productivity is measured by touches, yards, touchdowns, fumbles,
and fumbles lost. Touches are defined as the sum of a player’s rushing attempts and
3 Our data are right truncated to provide the ability to use parametric survival analysis. Players are excluded if
they play for more than one team during a season. Players are also excluded from the sample if a season is
missing or skipped in the USA Today’s NFL salary database (content.usatoday.com/sportsdata/football/nfl/
salaries/team) or if their salary is not available in this database.
receptions, the number of opportunities a player has to gain yards. Touches are
expected to have an ambiguous impact on career length because holding yards
(and other measures) constant, an additional touch is simply another opportunity
for a player to get injured or it might control for increased performance. Yards
are defined as the sum of a player’s rushing and receiving yards. Yards are
expected to have a positive impact on career length because they measure the
impact of the player’s ability to help the team get closer to a scoring opportunity.
Touchdowns are defined as the sum of a player’s rushing and receiving touch-
downs. Touchdowns are expected to have a positive impact on career length
because they measure the impact of the player’s ability to help the team score
points. Fumbles represents the number of times a player has possession of the
football and loses possession while fumbles lost measures those fumbles where
the opposing team recovers possession. Fumbles and fumbles lost are expected to
have a negative impact on career length because they represent either an oppor-
tunity for the opposing team to gain possession, or an actual loss of possession.
In addition to direct performance measures, we include demographic variables
believed to be associated with performance. Body mass index and age are all measured
during the first season the player enters professional football. Body mass index is
expected to have a positive impact on player career length, while age is expected to
have a negative impact.4
The defensive sample contains 653 players and 2,347 player years. Defensive
backs represent 42.7 % of the defensive players while defensive linemen repre-
sent 29.6 % of the defensive players. Linebackers represent the remaining
27.7 % of the defensive players. Defensive backs have slightly shorter careers
than other defensive positions and hence represent only 40.5 % of the defensive
player years, while linemen and linebackers represent 31.1 % and 28.4 % of the
defensive player years respectively.
The offensive sample contains 414 players and 1,368 player years. Running backs
and wide receivers represent 39.7 and 41.4 % of the offensive players respectively.
Tight ends account for only 18.9 % of the offensive sample. Running backs have
slightly shorter careers than other offensive players and represent only 38.5 % of the
offensive player years. Tight ends have slightly longer careers and represent 20.5 % of
the player years, while wide receivers represent 41.0 % of player years.
The failure variable used to indicate whether a player’s career length ends is a set of
dummy variables representing each season a player played in the NFL. It is coded 1 for
the season a player exits the NFL and 0 for all seasons the player does not exit the NFL.
We determine which seasons a player plays in the NFL by the season variable that is
included in both the NFL official website data and the USA Today NFL salary
database. We determine which season is the player’s last season in the NFL by
identifying the last year indicated by the season variable in both the NFL official
website data and the USAToday NFL salary database. In Fig. 1, we plot failure rates by
both race and tenure. We find that for both offensive and defensive players’ failure rates
follow a bathtub plot with high failures early then lower amounts of failure for early
4 In additional specifications weight, weight squared, and height were included. Weight and height both were
found to be insignificant while weight squared was found to increase career length suggesting that player BMI
might best capture the influence of height and weight on career length.
years of tenure and then increases for latter years of tenure (Groothuis and Hill 2004).
For defensive players the white player failure rate is higher at all years of tenure except
year six. For offensive players white players have lower failure rates for years two and
three but higher failure rates than blacks for years four through seven.
Player performance measures are time varying, while player demographic variables
are fixed throughout the player’s career. We also include year as a time trend to capture
changes to career length that might occur over time. To measure potential discrimina-
tion we use three measures. We first use a dummy variable equal to one if the player is
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Fig. 1 Failure Rates
black and zero otherwise. We also use percentage of black residents in the NFL team’s
home location and an interaction term between the player’s race and percentage of
black residents. If exit discrimination is present it should be found in the dummy
variable or the interaction term.
Empirical Model
In order to analyze if exit discrimination on career length is present in the NFL, we
estimate two different hazard models using data from the NFL. We use two different
techniques to test for robustness of the results. Both of the hazard models estimate the
impact of race and other relevant explanatory variables on the length of time a player
spends in the NFL. A hazard model defines an event which ends a spell of time, and
such an event is called a failure, which is a statistical term with no implication that the
event is desirable or undesirable. The failure in this research is the end of a player’s
NFL career. The hazard model calculates the conditional probability that the failure
occurs between time period t and t+1, given that the failure has not occurred before
time period t.
Parametric Hazard Model
The first model we estimate is the Weibull proportional hazard model with an inverse-
Gaussian distribution as the assumed distribution of the frailty for both the sample of
defensive positions and offensive positions.5 The Weibull proportional hazard model
assumes that the baseline hazard function has a Weibull distribution and allows
covariates to have a proportional impact on the hazard. The baseline hazard is denoted
by h0(t), time is denoted by t, the set of covariates is denoted by xj, and the Weibull
proportional hazard model is denoted by h(t|xj). The parameter p describes the direct
effect of time, net of other explanatory variables, in Weibull distributions. If p>1, the
hazard increases over time, while if p<1, the hazard decreases over time. In sports, the
hazard increases over time (p>1) because the hazard of ending a career is large and
growing year by year, based on aging. The hazard is exponentiated because it must be
positive to be a conditional probability of an event occurring at time t given that the
event did not occur before t.
h0 tð Þ ¼ ptp–1exp b0ð Þ ð1Þ
h t


x j
 
¼ h0 tð Þexp x jbx
  ð2Þ
h t


x j
 
¼ ptp–1exp b0 þ x jbx
  ð3Þ
5 For a discussion on frailty see Bodenhorn et al. (2012) and Price et al. (2008).
The Weibull distribution allows for flexibility in the baseline hazard and is an
appropriate choice as long as the baseline hazard is monotonically increasing or
decreasing. The proportional hazard model allows both time-varying and time invariant
covariates to have a proportional impact on the baseline hazard. There are many other
possible functional forms, but the estimates from hazard models are not sensitive to
these alternatives as long as there are no policy spikes, times at which many failures
occur, such as 52 weeks of unemployment or the date of reauthorization of welfare
benefits (Manton et al. 1992). There are no such fixed policy times in sports careers.
Two important issues that might arise in survival time models are right censoring
and left censoring. Those terms are based on a left to right time scale as in a graph.
Right censoring refers to incomplete spells where a player’s career has not ended by the
last year of the panel study. Right censoring is handled by hazard models with the
survivor function, which is the probability at time t that a spell has not ended by time t.
Left censoring occurs when players start their careers before the panel begins. Our data
has no left censoring. All careers in our data set begin either at the start of the panel,
2000, or after the panel study begins.
Semi-Parametric Hazard Model
To test for survival effects we estimate semi-parametric hazard functions following
Berger and Black (1998), and Groothuis and Hill (2004). Since our data is at the season
level we calculate our hazard model as a discrete random variable. As with Groothuis
and Hill (2004), we model the durations of a single spell and assume a homogeneous
environment so that the length of the spell is uncorrelated with the calendar time in
which the spell begins.6 This assumption lets us treat all the players’ tenure as the same
regardless of when it occurred in the panel study. For instance, all fourth year players
are considered to have the same baseline hazard regardless of calendar time so a fourth
year player in 2002 has the same baseline hazard as a fourth year player in 2008.
As the hazard function is the conditional probability of exiting the NFL given that
the NFL career lasted until the previous season, the hazard function must have a range
from zero to one. In principle, any mapping with a range from zero to one will work.
For our purposes we choose the logit model. The intuition behind the logit model for
the hazard function is relatively simple. For each year during the study in which the
player is in the NFL, the player either comes back for another season or ends his career.
If the career ends, the dependent variable takes on a value of one; otherwise, the
dependent variable is zero. The player remains in the panel until he exits the NFL or the
panel ends. If the panel ends before the end of the player’s career, we say the worker’s
spell is right-hand censored. If a player begins his NFL career at the start of the panel
and plays for 6 years he will enter the data set 6 times: the value of his dependent
variable will be zero for the first 5 years (tenure one through five) and be equal to one
for the sixth year. Note for all players who are right-hand censored, we do not know
when their career ends so their dependent variables are always coded as zero. To
simplify the computation of the likelihood function and be able to keep the long
careers, we simply approximate the dummy vector with a 4th order polynomial of the
players’ tenure in NFL, which reduces the number of parameters to be estimated from 8
6 For technical details of semi-parametric hazard model see Berger and Black (1998).
to 4. Thus, the hazard function becomes
Pr t; xbð Þ ¼ Pr ϕ tð Þ þ xbð Þ ð4Þ
where ϕ (t) is a 4th order polynomial of the player’s tenure in NFL. The 4th order
polynomial therefore includes tenure to the first, second, third, and fourth powers. Once
again, we choose the Taylor series approximation technique over using tenure dummies
due to the small number of observations for high tenures.7
Results
In Table 1 we report the means of the variables for the offensive players as a whole and
for the black and white subsets of players. We find that there is little difference between
games played and games started between non-white and white players with each group
playing slightly over 12 games and starting about 5.5 games on average. We do find
7 When higher order polynomials of the fifth and sixth power are included results do not change suggesting
that a fourth order polynomial is flexible enough to capture the influence of the baseline hazard. When using
dummy variables we find that the results are the same as when using the Taylor series approximation, using
tenure through the fourth power.
Table 1 Means offensive players
Variables All* Black* White*
Games played 12.18 (4.91) 12.16 (4.88) 12.27 (5.12)
Games started 5.47 (5.74) 5.40 (5.78) 5.81 (5.46)
Total touches 54.21 (77.82) 59.72 (82.42) 25.27 (30.07)
Total yards 391.27 (430.22) 419.71 (448.38) 248.60 (288.97)
Total touchdowns 2.46 (3.21) 2.62 (3.36) 1.65 (2.21)
Fumbles .84 (1.32) .93 (1.39) .35 (.68)
Fumbles lost .47 (.85) .52 (.89) .22 (.49)
Age 22.52 (1.01) 22.49 (1.06) 22.80 (.91)
Height 72.94 (2.64) 72.55 (2.46) 74.99 (2.31)
Weight 221.86 (24.7) 217.75 (23.41) 242.55 (21.39)
Running backs .38 (.42) .41 (.49) .22 (.40)
Tight end .21 (.40) .13 (33) .60 (.49)
Wide receiver .41 (.49) .46 (.49) .18 (.38)
Black .84 (.37) 1.00 -
White .16 (.37) - 1.00
Years played 2.97 (1.98) 2.97 (1.97) 2.96 (2.05)
Observations 1,368 1,132 219
Career length 3.78 (2.42) 3.81 (2.47) 3.53 (2.51)
Observations
Players
1,368
414
1,149
341
219
73
* Mean (standard deviation)
that non-white players have more touches, more total yards, more fumbles and fumbles
lost than white players on average. This might be due to non-white players having a
higher productivity on the offensive positions or due to players being in different
positions. When it comes to position, we find that sixty percent of white players are
tight ends, eighteen percent wide receivers and twenty two percent running backs,
while forty one percent of non-white players are running backs and forty six percent are
wide receivers and only thirteen percent are tight ends. We also find that white players
are taller and heavier than non-white offensive players. Lastly, we find that average
years played is the same and career length is slightly longer for non-white players than
white players.
In Table 2 we report the results of both the Weibull hazard model and the Berger and
Black semi-parametric model for offensive players. The Weibull coefficients reported
are hazard ratios. Coefficients less than one are associated with variables that increase
career length. In the Berger and Black model the logit estimates the likelihood of
exiting a career. Negative coefficients are associated with variables that increase career
length. Once again, we report both models to test for the robustness of the results. We
find in both models performance increases career length (lowers the probability of exit)
Table 2 Exit discrimination offensive player model
Variables Weibull Haz. Ratio1 Logit Model
Games played .873** (6.89) -.137** (704)
Games started .888** (2.75) -.084** (2.18)
Total touches 1.03** (3.44) .022** (3.25)
Total yards .992** (4.26) -.006** (3.60)
Total touchdowns .914 (1.06) -.052 (0.59)
Fumbles .869 (0.70) -.060 (0.38)
Fumbles lost 1.12 (0.34) -.07 (0.22)
Age .961 (0.60) .505** (5.59)
BMI .813 (3.34) -.192** (3.19)
Tight end 1.27 (0.58) .399 (1.09)
Running back 1.94* (1.81) .708** (2.04)
Black .562 (0.88) -.330 (0.53)
Percent black city .987 (0.73) -.006 (0.37)
Black * Percent black city 1.01 (0.79) .010 (0.55)
Year .859** (1.94) .516** (5.11)
Constant 1.6e+135** (1.96) -1044.22** (5.09)
Wald / Pseudo R2 376.06* .333
Observations
Players
1,368
414
-(z- statistic in parentheses)
** significant at 95 % level
*significant at 90 % level
Standard error adjusted for 414 individual players
1 Inverse-Gaussian frailty specification
with increases in games played and games started all significantly increasing career
length in all models. Total yards significantly increases career length in the Weibull
specifications of the model but has no significant impact on duration in the Logit
models. We do find, however, that increases in total touches lower career length in all
models, supporting the conjecture that more touches lead to potential injury. We also
find that BMI increases career length; younger players exhibit significantly longer
careers in the Weibull models and a significantly higher probability of duration in one
of the Logit models.
When it comes to exit discrimination neither model finds that race, percent of the
team’s fan base that is black, or the interaction term influences career length. We do
find, however, that the position played does influence career length. We find that
running backs have shorter careers. Overall our results show that career length for a
player on offense is influenced by performance and not by race.
We report the means of the defensive players in Table 3. We find that white players
on average play slightly fewer games and start slightly fewer games. Non-white players
have more tackles, interceptions and passes defended but fewer sacks than white
players. The differences in productivity might be due to the positional makeup of each
defensive position. We find that white players have a larger proportion of defensive
lineman and linebackers while non-white players have the largest proportions of
Table 3 Means defensive players
Variables All* Black* White*
Games played 13.04 (4.38) 13.11 (4.32) 12.69 (4.75)
Games started 7.30 (6.60) 7.32 (6.59) 6.74 (6.66)
Tackles 41.19 (32.34) 41.19 (32.01) 39.37 (33.81)
Sacks 1.29 (2.30) 1.20 (2.17) 1.78 (2.92)
Passes defended 2.98 (3.88) 3.19 (4.05) 1.59 (2.16)
Forced fumbles .63 (1.05) .65 (1.05) .51 (.98)
Interceptions .72 (1.34) .78 (1.41) .32 (.71)
Age 22.60 (.97) 22.57 (.95) 22.87 (1.13)
Height 73.50 (2.24) 73.31 (2.21) 74.66 (2.11)
Weight 241.13 (43.02) 239.09 (43.83) 248.71 (32.30)
Defensive linemen .31 (.46) .29 (.45) .39 (.48)
Defensive backs .41 (.49) .44 (.49) .23 (.41)
Defensive line backers .28 (.44) .27 (.44) .38 (.42)
Black .88 (.33) 1.00 -
White .12 (.33) - 1.00
Years Played 3.01 (1.94) 3.00 3.15
Observation 2,347 1999 282
Career Length 4.23 (2.37) 4.19 (2.36) 4.47 (2.49)
Observations
Players
2,347
653
2,065
581
282
72
*Mean (standard deviation)
defensive backs. As with the offensive players, we also find that defensive white
players are taller and heavier than non-white defensive players. Lastly, we find that
average years played is the same and career length is slightly longer for white players
than non-white players. Overall we find that eighty eight percent of players on defense
are non-white and twelve percent white.
In Table 4 we report the results of both the Weibull and Berger and Black Logit
models. As with offensive models, we find that productivity increases career length.
The more games played, tackles, sacks, and passes defended the longer the career and
the lower the likelihood of exit. Interceptions and games started are of expected sign but
are statistically insignificant. This could be due to the collinearity of the performance
variables. As with offensive players, we find that an increase in a player’s BMI
increases career length; younger players exhibit significantly longer careers in the
Weibull models and a significantly higher probability of duration in one of the Logit
models.
The coefficients on the race dummy in the Weibull and the logit model are
insignificant. In addition, both the percentage of city that is black and the interaction
term between race and percentage black are also insignificant. The insignificant
coefficients in all specifications suggest that exit discrimination is not present for
Table 4 Exit discrimination defensive player model
Variables Weibull Haz. Ratio1 Logit coefficient
Games played .893** (4.01) -.137** (6.31)
Games started 1.00 (0.03) .006 (0.17)
Tackles .965** (3.31) -.038** (3.51)
Sacks .539** (3.70) -.462** (2.57)
Passes defended .774** (3.81) -.156** (2.02)
Forced fumbles .931 (0.36) .097 (0.45)
Interceptions .770* (1.61) -.417* (1.79)
Age .931 (0.97) .321** (4.04)
BMI .836** (3.83) -.144** (3.20)
Defensive linemen 1.51 (1.15) .153 (0.44)
Defensive backs .559 (2.12) -.493* (1.93)
Year .737 (3.33) .201** (2.08)
Black 1.41 (0.60) .601 (1.15)
Percent black city 1.00 (0.32) .010 (0.03)
Black * percent black city 1.01 (0.44) . -.0004 (0.84)
Constant 2.8** (3.32) -409.899** (2.10)
Wald / Pseudo R2 124.33** .356
Observations players 2,347
653
–(z- statistic in parentheses) ** significant at 95 % level *significant at 90 % level
Standard error adjusted for 653 individual players in both specifications
1 Inverse-Gaussian frailty specification
defensive players. Our results show that career length for a player on defense is
influenced by performance and not by race.
Conclusion
Our results are consistent with recent findings in both the NBA and Major League
Baseball that failed to find evidence of exit discrimination in the 1990s. In both our
parametric Weibull and semi-parametric Berger and Black analysis, we find that
performance variables are important in determining career length for both offensive
and defensive players in the NFL. We find no evidence that race affects the career
duration of black players. Past research had suggested that discrimination by majority,
white fans led owners in sports to keep less talented white players on rosters. Our
results suggest that team owners in the pursuit of championships keep talented players
regardless of race. This may be an affirmation of Becker’s theoretical implications of
market competition overcoming labor market discrimination.
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